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Abstract 
 
The general tendency in modern hardware is an increase in fault rates, which is 
caused by the decreased operation voltages and feature sizes. Previously, the issue 
of hardware faults was mainly approached only in high-availability enterprise servers 
and in safety-critical  applications,  such as transport  or aerospace domains. These 
fields generally have very tight requirements, but also higher budgets.  However, as 
fault rates are increasing, fault tolerance solutions are starting to be also required in 
applications that have much smaller profit margins. This brings to the front the idea of 
software-implemented hardware fault tolerance, that is, the ability to detect and tolerate 
hardware faults using software-based techniques in commodity CPUs, which allows to 
get resilience almost for free. Current  solutions, however, are lacking in performance, 
even though they show quite good fault tolerance results. 
This thesis explores the idea of using the Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) 
technology for executing all program’s operations on two copies of the same data. This 
idea is based on the observation that SIMD is ubiquitous in modern CPUs and is 
usually an underutilized resource. It allows us to detect bit-flips in hardware by a simple 
comparison of two copies under the assumption that only one copy is affected by a fault. 
We implemented this idea as a source-to-source compiler which performs hardening of 
a program on the source code level. The evaluation of our several implementations shows 
that it is beneficial to use it for applications that are dominated by arithmetic or logical 
operations, but those that have more control-flow or memory operations are actually 
performing better with the regular instruction replication. For example, we managed to 
get only 15% performance overhead on Fast Fourier Transformation benchmark, which is 
dominated by arithmetic  instructions,  but memory-access-dominated Dijkstra algorithm 
has shown a high overhead of 200%. 
 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
 
List of Figures IX 
List of Tables  XI 
1 Introduction 1 
 
2 Background and Related  Work 3 
2.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
2.2 Background   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
 
3 Design  15 
3.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
3.2 System and Fault Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
 
4 Implementation  23 
4.1 Used technologies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
4.2 Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
4.3 Performance bottlenecks   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
4.4 Alternative implementation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
 
5 Evaluation 31 
5.1 Performance testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
5.2 Fault injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
5.3 Discussion   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
 
6 Conclusion And Future Work 37 
 
Bibliography 39 
 
 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
 
2.1 Scalar and SIMD processing compared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
2.2 GPR and SSE registers compared  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
2.3 Intel Core 2 execution unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
2.4 Horizontal  addition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
2.5 Shuffle operation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
3.1 Compiler  structure   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
3.2 Example of Abstract Syntax Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
3.3 SIMD-Swift compiler structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
3.4 Variable conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
4.1 Memory  access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
4.2 Implementation  of checks.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
4.3 Results of pointer fault injection.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
 
5.1 Performance testing results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
5.2 Fault injection  results.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
5.3 Window  of vulnerability.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
 
 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
 
 
2.1 Comparison  of main software-based redundancy  approaches. . . . . . . . 8 
 
4.1 Type mapping.   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
4.2 Arithmetic  operations.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
4.3 Truth table for logical AND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
4.4 Logical OR replaced by bitwise OR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
4.5 Bitwise  operations.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
4.6 Implementation  of comparisons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
 
 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
 
Before  2000s, research efforts in the field of dependability  (also called “reliability”, 
“resiliency” and “fault tolerance”) primarily  considered applications that can afford 
extra expenses. Most common of those were systems in which human life or well-being 
depends on correct operation — so-called “safety critical”  systems. One such example 
is a spacecraft, which usually has incredibly complicated safety requirements and high 
budgets. For example, Space Shuttle Endeavor has cost approximately  $1.7 billion in 
total [NAS00] and contained five identical general-purpose computers to achieve fault 
tolerance [Skl76]. 
Another research direction were enterprise servers. Although  they may not be critical 
for human lives, unavailability  of such a server may lead to high expenses. HP NonStop 
series [McE81] is a vivid example of this domain. 
Nowadays, however, things have changed. In the first place, the probability  of hardware 
errors is becoming non-negligible in general. Hardware manufacturers are constantly 
decreasing feature sizes and lowering operation voltages in order to get higher performance 
and smaller energy consumption.  Such changes allow to get better functional  parameters, 
but they also make hardware much more vulnerable to faults. Microsoft has performed 
failure analysis on a large testing set [NDO11] and it concluded that machines with at 
least 30 days of accumulated CPU time have 1 in 190 chance of a crash. After the first 
failure the probability  of a subsequent failure gets up to two orders of magnitude higher. 
The second observation is that high-end servers are not dominating the market anymore. 
Instead, components of the shelf (COTS)  are becoming a de-facto standard for large-scale 
systems, such as data centers, because they are much more cost-effective. COTS usually 
do not have much error protection, except for the basic error correcting codes (ECC) for 
DRAM. Google has conducted a study of DRAM failures in production clusters [SPW09] 
and it shows that about a third of machines and over 8% of DIMMs experienced at least 
one uncorrectable error per year. 
The third note is that mission critical systems can be found in commodity products 
nowadays, such as car control applications and software for autonomous cars. In those 
fields, budgets are usually much smaller than, for instance, in aerospace, but human lives 
also depend on execution correctness. For example, if an Electronic Braking System 
[BM91] fails, a car may crash into an obstacle at full speed. 
Historically, the initial approach for dealing with errors was hardware redundancy. The 
most costly option is to use double or triple modular redundancy (DMR and TMR) with 
majority voting, but it is also the most reliable one. Therefore it is used, for example, in 
Boeing 777 [Yeh96]. Cheaper hardware solutions include watchdogs [BS04], redundant 
hardware threads [Gom+03] or additional  logic within a processor [McE81; Sle+99]. 
Hardware-based solutions are very efficient in terms of performance and normally their 
overhead is between 5% and 10%. They, however, tend to be too expensive for markets 
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with small profit margins and usually not energy-efficient. In order to overcome these 
drawbacks, one can avoid using hardware redundancy by applying so-called Software- 
Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance (SIHFT), that is, fault tolerance achieved by 
software-based methods [Gol+06]. Another benefit of this approach is that it can be 
applied selectively. For example, in modern cars most of the computational  power has 
to be situated under the driver’s seat, which is proven to be the safest place in the car 
[Int14]. It means that a single system executes all computations, both safety-critical, 
like breaks control, and non-critical, like multimedia. By using SIHFT we can avoid 
redundancy for non-critical applications and apply it only to critical ones. 
Having these benefits, most of SIHFT solutions are based on the idea of duplicated 
execution, which means that all critical parts of a program are executed twice. It leads 
to one major disadvantage — even the most optimized state-of-the-art solutions have at 
least 100% performance overhead caused by duplication. This may be a big issue for 
some domains.  For example, autonomous cars need to process approximately  1 GB of 
data each second, which leads to very high requirements for computational effectiveness 
[Int14]. Our goal is to overcome this drawback and to develop a software-based solution 
with less than 80% overhead. 
In this thesis, we introduce SIMD-Swift,  a software-based single-threaded approach to 
achieving data- and partial control-flow fault tolerance. It is based on Error Detection by 
Duplicated Instructions (EDDI) [OSM02] and its successor Software-Implemented fault 
tolerance (SWIFT)  [Rei+05], which duplicate all instructions and insert periodic checks. 
Our hypothesis is that employing Single Instruction Multiple  Data (SIMD) technology for 
fault tolerance will improve performance of SIHFT by reducing the number of executed 
instructions and used registers (decreased register pressure).  The main idea behind 
our approach is to trade time redundancy (duplicated execution) for space redundancy 
(bigger SIMD registers are used instead of regular registers). SIMD can be considered a 
commodity hardware since virtually all modern CPUs have it: x86 (Intel, AMD) has 
SSE and AVX, PowerPC (IBM) has AltiVec, and ARM has Neon. 
We implemented SIMD-Swift  as a source-to-source compiler and our evaluation shows 
promising results with benchmarks that are dominated by arithmetic or logic operations. 
For these types of benchmarks we achieved a performance overhead of at most 75%, and 
for those that purely consist of arithmetic operations, we managed to get it as low as 15%. 
Applications that contain mostly control-flow operations or memory interactions show, 
however, much higher overheads and in general perform worse than SWIFT-hardened. 
The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we start with a discussion of the 
existing approaches for handling hardware faults and come to the conclusion that SIMD 
may be a promising way to improve over the existing solutions. Then we continue with 
a detailed review of SIMD (in particular, SSE) and ways to use it. In Chapter  3 we 
describe a general architecture of our approach and explain our assumptions. Chapter 4 
goes into details of the implementation and highlights its performance bottlenecks. We 
also propose an alternative implementation of SIMD-Swift,  which offers a trade-off 
between performance and fault detection capabilities. In Chapter  5, we evaluate the 
implementation and discuss the drawbacks of SIMD-Swift  from both performance and 
resilience points of view. Chapter 6 considers applicability  of the approach and discusses 
directions of the future work. 
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2  Background  and Related  Work 
 
 
2.1  Related  Work 
 
Two broad types of fault tolerance techniques exist: hardware-based and software-based 
(SIHFT). All of them implement some kind of redundancy,  but they do it on different levels: 
hardware-based approaches employ redundant hardware blocks and most software-based 
ones use redundant  execution. 
 
2.1.1  Hardware-based  solutions 
 
Hardware redundancy is a very old technique and it was used in mechanical devices even 
before first computers. The most basic approach for hardware redundancy is n Modular 
Redundancy (nMR), including Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) and Triple Modular 
Redundancy (TMR). nMR means that all parts of a system have redundant replicas that 
can be used in case the main one would fail. Although it is expensive, this approach 
provides a very high level of reliability, which is why it is widely used in aerospace 
industry. One of the most popular Boeing airplanes, Boeing 777, applies TMR for all 
main parts of its control system: Primary Flight Computer, communication paths and 
even electrical power supply [Yeh96]. 
This approach is also applicable for high-availability  servers. HP NonStop Advanced 
Architecture  [Ber+05] consists of two or three SMP Itanium2 server processors working 
in loose synchronization. Error detection is performed by comparing execution results of 
the processors. A more conservative way is to add redundancy only to critical blocks 
in hardware.  This approach is widely used among highly-available  servers.  As one 
example, IBM S/390 G5 [Sle+99] fully duplicates  only the main blocks of the processor — 
units that handle instruction fetching, decoding, and execution. Unfortunately, all these 
approaches increase the buying and maintenance cost up to 5 times over commodity 
hardware. 
Instead of replication  some approaches use a small and simple coprocessor (watchdog 
processor) which monitors the main CPU and performs concurrent error detection 
[MM88]. A similar direction takes the Dynamic Implementation Verification Architecture 
(DIVA) technique [Aus99] by adding a simple checker module. It verifies the correctness 
of computation on the core processor and permits only correct results to be written to a 
storage. Inherent Time Redundancy (ITR) [RR07] also uses a checker, but only for 
decode and fetch units. Such checker exploits small traces of identical instructions and 
observes re-occurrence of events that depend purely on instructions. Argus [MBS07] 
performs dynamic verification of core invariants by a series of hardware checkers. These 
checker coprocessors are still an active research field, but they did not yet make it to 
industry. 
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Parity and Error Correcting Codes (ECC) protection is also a very popular way of 
achieving reliability, even though it provides only partial protection from faults [SPW09; 
NDO11]. Parity protection was widely used for register files in platforms such as Intel 
Itanium  [Fet+06] and SunUltraSPARC [KAO05]. ECC modules are used in many 
high-end RAM chips to check incoming and outgoing data from memory. Parity and 
ECC, however, only protect storage and not computation which we target in this thesis. 
 
2.1.2  Redundant  Multithreading solutions 
 
In between hardware and software solutions lay redundant multicore and multithreaded 
systems, which make use of readily available multiple execution blocks in modern 
processors.  One of the early efforts in this direction  was made in AR-SMT [Rot99], 
which presents somehow similar approach to DMR, but instead of physical hardware 
duplication it uses OS-level resources. Main  computation  is replicated into two threads — 
one leading and one trailing.  The trailing thread repeats the computation and compares 
produced result with the leading thread. 
The following studies tried to improve this approach.  Mukherjee et al. [MKR02] 
reduced the performance overhead of AR-SMT by implementing it in a dual-processor 
device. Smolens et al. [Smo+04] proposed a set of changes to a conventional superscalar 
microarchitecture in order to make communication in concurrent error detection more 
efficient. Wells et al. [WCS09] worked on a problem of mixed-mode computation, that is, 
a mode in which some applications have high reliability  using multithreaded duplication, 
while other applications run normally without any performance penalty. This technology 
allows to make a performance-reliability  trade-off not on the hardware, but on the 
application level. 
Recent work of Zhang et al. called RAFT [Zha+12] proposes a low-overhead solution 
based on running a program binary twice and monitoring both instances’ behavior at 
the system call level. Internally, before executing a system call, a first instance compares 
its arguments with the arguments of a second one. If the arguments match, the system 
call is executed, otherwise RAFT reports an error and stops program execution. Such 
approach shows only 2.8% average overhead, which is one of the best performances 
among multithreaded solutions. 
The same idea was implemented at the level of processes as Process Level Redundancy 
(PLR) [Shy+09]. It works as a software application and does not require any changes 
neither to hardware nor to OS or target application itself. PLR also provides an additional 
protection for the memory since memory is duplicated on process replicas. 
 
2.1.3  Software-based solutions 
 
Even though hardware-based approaches are very efficient in terms of performance and 
expose only 5–10% overhead, they all require specialized or additional hardware, which 
adds up to the total cost of the system. A more attractive way is to use software-based 
solutions which essentially come free of cost. 
Software-based approaches modify the original program into a functionally similar 
resilient version with some kind of redundancy that allows to detect errors. It should be 
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noted however, that they all consider only hardware fault tolerance: they assume correct 
code without bugs such that the faulty behavior can be caused only by hardware faults. 
The main idea behind most of the recent single-threaded software-based solutions 
is duplicated execution (instruction duplication), that is, all instructions are executed 
twice and their results are compared. Holm and Banerjee [HB92] were the first ones 
to investigate this direction, although they kept it mainly theoretical. Their idea was 
implemented and further developed in EDDI [OSM02].  It benefits from Instruction 
Level Parallelism (ILP)1  of modern processors and duplicates not only instructions 
but also memory state. SWIFT [Rei+05] added control flow checks and removed 
redundant memory duplication due to the assumption that memory is protected via 
ECC. ESoftCheck [YGS09] implemented a set of optimizations for SWIFT in order to 
improve performance. These three works constitute a basis for our thesis, that is why we 
will take a closer look at them. We will also discuss a bit different Shoestring [Fen+10] 
approach, which combines instruction  duplication  with symptom-based error detection. 
 
 
2.1.3.1 Error Detection by Duplicated  Instructions 
 
The main idea behind Error Detection by Duplicated Instructions (EDDI) [OSM02] 
is to exploit unused ILP resources available in VLIW2  architectures to run duplicated 
instructions concurrently. These instructions do not change functionality  of the program, 
but an error in one duplicate most probably will lead to a different result of computation, 
which can be detected by comparing two results.  EDDI also protects data by using 
different registers and memory addresses for new instructions. 
Checking (comparing results of two duplicates) every instruction is an overkill in most 
cases. First, it will lead to an extremely high performance overhead and second, most of 
variables are dependent on each other, that is, an error in one variable will propagate to 
others. For that reason, EDDI performs checks only at points of the program that may 
influence its output. Those points are: 
 
• program input and output 
• memory accesses 
• deciding a direction of branch or jump 
 
Consider a simple program performing addition and multiplication,  and then printing 
the result (see Listing  2.1). Listing  2.2 shows a hardened version of the same code. In the 
first place, all input variables have to be duplicated (lines 2–4). Then, all instructions are 
executed twice on different replicas (lines 6–9) and result is checked for equality before 
the output (lines 11–12). In case results are different the program is crashed, since it 
indicates an error. 
 
 
1 Instruction Level Parallelism — an ability to perform  multiple operations simultaneously on a single 
core. 
2 Very  Long  Instruction Word  — a family  of processor architectures  allowing  programs to  explicitly 
specify which  instructions will be executed in parallel. 
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1     // b, c and d are input arguments 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6     a = b + c; 
7 
8     r = d * a; 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14     printf("Result: %d", r); 
Listing 2.1: Example of EDDI — 
original code 
1     // b, c and d are input arguments 
2     b1 = b; b2 = b; 
3     c1 = c; c2 = c; 
4     d1 = d; d2 = d; 
5 
6     a1 = b1 + c1; 
7     a2 = b2 + c2; 
8     r1 = d1 * a1; 
9     r2 = d2 * a2; 
10 
11     if (r1 != r2) 
12  crash(); 
13 
14     printf("Result: %d", r1); 
Listing 2.2: Example of EDDI — 
hardened code 
 
EDDI works with bit-flip faults, that is, it can detect all faults that can be modeled as 
bit-flips. This includes state changes in memory cells and registers, data corruption in 
data and address buses, transient errors in functional units and control logic, etc. It also 
detects control-flow errors caused by branch instruction faults. 
EDDI assumes VLIW architecture that allows a compiler to explicitly control parallel 
execution of instructions. It usually means that a lot of parallelization  resources are 
left unused and can be adopted for executing duplicates. That is the reason why EDDI 
shows only 80% overhead instead of more than 100% that can be expected from at least 
twice as much instructions. 
Duplication is performed on the assembly source code level, but it is not the only option. 
Rebaudengo et al. [Reb+01] took another direction and implemented a source-to-source 
compiler which adds redundancy at a higher level of abstraction — C source code. This 
adds portability to the solution, but both overhead and fault coverage got worse. Also, 
this approach works only with all compiler optimizations turned off. 
 
 
2.1.3.2 Software  Implemented  Fault Tolerance 
The next step in the development of duplicated execution was Software Implemented 
Fault Tolerance (SWIFT) [Rei+05]. Its main contribution consists of two parts. 
First, it adds control-flow protection to EDDI. All code is split into blocks with only 
one entry point and one exit point — basic blocks. Each of them gets a signature, which 
is used to detect control-flow faults. One of the general purpose registers keeps a current 
signature and is used for checking. Every time a program enters another basic block, 
this register is XOR’ed with a statically determined constant and it gets a value of the 
current block’s signature. This signature is also statically assigned to the block and by 
comparing with it we can detect control transfer errors. Such protection also makes 
EDDI’s branch validation  unnecessary, which improves its performance. 
Second, SWIFT assumes ECC-protected  memory and caches. It allows to eliminate 
memory duplication  and significantly  reduces memory requirements. Moreover, it reduces 
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cache pressure hence increasing performance. All registers, however, are kept duplicated 
and all values still have to be loaded twice. 
This set of optimizations  reduced overhead on average to 40% on tests performed by 
the authors. Such promising results in both SWIFT and EDDI, however, were achieved 
because of the availability  of free ILP resources, which appear if VLIW architecture is 
used. This architecture was considered promising at that time with Intel introducing its 
VLIW-based Itanium CPU and many thought it would become standard. Yet, VLIW 
did not become popular and paper’s assumptions do not hold on a much more common 
nowadays x86 architecture.  It means that results from the original papers can not be 
applied to modern commodity CPUs and we need a better estimation.  One of the 
works that tried to do it belongs to Yu et al. [YGS09] and it shows an average 116% 
performance overhead for the original SWIFT. 
 
 
2.1.3.3  ESoftCheck 
 
EDDI and SWIFT insert a check before every load, store and branching operation, such 
that checks account for approximately 40% of the overhead. ESoftCheck [YGS09] applies 
a set of optimizations  in order to remove this redundancy: 
 
• Recurrent checks. If a check of one value is always followed by another check 
of the same value and this value is never changed between them, first one can be 
considered redundant. It can be removed since an error will always (or at least 
with very high probability) be detected by the second check. 
 
• Dependent variables. Two variables can be called dependent if a value of a 
second variable is a function of the first one. That means there is no point in 
checking both dependent variables,  since an error from the first variable will 
propagate to the second and this first check can be removed. 
 
• Loop  checks.  Induction variables and loop invariants can be considered dependent 
on themselves and any error will propagate to the end of the loop. Thus checking 
this variables is redundant if we add covering checks at the loop exit. 
 
• Protected registers. On some platforms registers are either already hardware- 
protected or can be protected at low cost. Such protection can detect errors in 
registers themselves, but not in values that are stored to them as a result of faulty 
computation. That means, we can remove redundant register checks, but we have 
to keep checks before stores to prevent faults from propagating to memory. 
 
After these optimizations  only checks that are required to detect an error are left. 
ESoftCheck  guarantees that an optimized code will have the same level of reliability  as 
the original code, thus reducing performance overheads at basically no cost. 
If we consider x86 architecture  without  register protection, performance overhead 
of this approach is on average 102%, which is still not a big improvement. Moreover, 
ESoftCheck can be partially applied to our SIMD-Swift in order to reduce overhead even 
further. 
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2.1.3.4 Shoestring 
 
Shoestring [Fen+10] stays a bit aside from duplicated execution approaches, but it is 
still worth mentioning since it shows comparably low performance overhead of 16% with 
a reasonable failure rate of 1.6%. Such results are achieved by combining instruction 
duplication with a symptom-based error detection. The symptoms can include memory 
access exceptions, mispredicted branches and cache misses. 
This solution is based on the idea that most of transient faults either will not produce 
an error or will lead to a user-visible failure that can be covered with low-overhead 
symptom-based detection. For example, a fault in memory will most probably lead to a 
segmentation fault which is already detected by OS. All the other faults can be covered 
with instruction duplication using compiler analysis to identify vulnerable parts of code. 
The use case of this approach is shifted from high-availability  and mission-critical 
domains towards modern commodity electronics, which starts to experience significant 
amounts of faults, but does not have high reliability  requirements. That is why it provides 
only opportunistic  fault coverage and cannot be used in high-reliability applications. 
 
 
Table 2.1 gives a comparison of the presented software-based approaches. Columns 
“Replication  Coverage” represent an extent to which a given aspect is covered by an 
approach. In “Overhead” columns low means that performance overhead is less than 
50%, moderate  indicates a range between 50% and 100 % and high — more than 100% 
 
Name Replication Coverage Overhead Instruction Register Memory 
access 
Memory 
state 
Control 
transfer 
VLIW x86 
EDDI 
SWIFT 
ESoftCheck 
Shoestring 
full 
full 
full 
partial 
full 
full 
none 
partial 
full 
full 
full 
partial 
full 
none 
none 
partial 
none 
partial 
partial 
none 
moderate 
low 
low 
no data 
high 
high 
high 
low 
 
Table 2.1: Comparison of main software-based redundancy approaches. 
 
 
 
2.2  Background 
 
Our solution relies heavily on the Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) technology. 
The main idea behind it is to perform the same operation on multiple pieces of data 
simultaneously (data level parallelism).  Figure 2.1 illustrates the difference between 
traditional and SIMD processing. In general, SIMD adds new, wider registers that are 
capable of storing several items and the corresponding new instructions that operate on 
these resisters, computing in parallel on all items. 
The first modern implementation of SIMD in processors, called Visual Instruction Set 
(VIS) [Koh+95], was presented by Sun Microsystems in 1995 as an extension for the 
SPARC architecture. It was initially  marketed as a substitution for discrete video cards 
and, although it never became one, it has found its niche as an efficient way to optimize 
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Figure 2.1: Scalar  and  SIMD processing compared 
 
data processing. Next year, a multimedia extension was also presented for the MIPS 
architecture [Gwe96]. 
Yet, it was not before the Intel MMX [PW96] extension for the x86 architecture that 
SIMD became widely available and used in commodity processors. MMX introduced 
three packed data types and a set of instructions to operate on them. Data types include 
packed byte (8 bytes in one 64-bit quantity), packed word (4 words in one 64-bit quantity) 
and packed doubleword (2 doublewords in one 64-bit quantity). They all use 64-bit 
registers shared with regular floating-point instructions. Although MMX instructions 
work with MMX registers, General Purpose Registers (GPR) must be used to specify a 
memory address operand. 
Nowadays, the successor of MMX  called Streaming SIMD Extension (SSE) is the 
most common implementation of SIMD. According to the Steam statistics  [Ste15], it 
is available in 99% of user machines (this number, however, should be treated with 
care, while gamers tend to have more powerful hardware than average users). Initially 
SSE was targeted on multimedia applications, in particular on visual and graphical 
computing.  Nevertheless, nowadays it is widely used in all applications that require 
similar operations on big amounts of data, including digital audio processing, computer 
vision and even Bitcoin mining. 
SSE originally appeared in the Pentium III processor [RPK00]. It gained a lot of 
popularity by providing compelling performance improvement at a very low cost, since 
it is much easier and cheaper for processor manufacturers to add another execution 
block and an extra set of registers than to implement a full-scale core. Still, it is hardly 
comparable with multicore parallelism — performance boost can be achieved only for 
certain types of applications and sometimes even only for certain regions of code. That 
means, SIMD is hardly used in all other applications and can be considered a free 
resource [Ram12]. 
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From the usage point of view, SSE added a completely separate logical register set to 
the one available in MMX, which allows to use these technologies concurrently (although, 
MMX is irrelevant in the scope of this thesis). This set consists of eight 128-bit registers, 
each able to hold 4 single-precision floating point numbers. 
The second generation, SSE2, was intended to fully replace MMX. In order to do that, 
it introduced 5 new data types: packed double-precision floating point and packed 8-, 
16-, 32- and 64-bit integers. SSE2 also contained a set of corresponding instructions to 
operate on this data. 
Afterwards, SSE was evolving more gradually.  The third generation introduced a 
notion of horizontal  operations (e.g., horizontal addition), which operate on pairs of values 
in one SSE register. SSSE3 added a couple of new arithmetic and shuffle instructions. 
The latest version SSE4, among other new instructions, presented the PTEST — an 
instruction that sets the Z flag in status registers (EFLAGS) by performing an AND 
between its operands, thus allowing to do jumps using packed values directly. 
SSE is available only in Intel and AMD processors, but similar technologies can be 
found in the majority of modern architectures, including the embedded domain. It is 
implemented in PowerPC as AltiVec [Gwe98] extension, in ARM as Neon [ARM10], and 
even Atmel microcontrollers have it inside of a Digital Signal Processing (DSP) modules. 
Since our solution uses a basic idea of SIMD,  it can be ported to any of the mentioned 
architectures with minimal changes. In this thesis, however, we will concentrate on SSE, 
as the most common technology in general-purpose processors. Specifically,  we will use 
its latest version, SSE 4.2, as it gives the widest functionality  and allows us to get the 
most effective solutions. 
 
Before we go deeper into the details, consider a small example of a common SSE 
application.  Listing 2.3 shows a simple loop written in C without any extensions. This 
loop performs a single-precision floating-point triad operation on the arrays of size SIZE. 
 
1  float a[SIZE], b[SIZE], c[SIZE]; 
2  float q; 
3 
4  void triad() { 
5  for (int i = 0; i < SIZE; i++) { 
6  a[i] = b[i] + q * c[i]; 
7  } 
8  } 
Listing 2.3: Original loop 
 
This program can be rewritten using SSE (see Listing  2.4). It will allow to perform 4 
triad operations simultaneously in one loop iteration, thus significantly improving the 
performance. The first change here is the 16-byte alignment of all arrays on the line 3. 
Such alignment is required because otherwise CPU would have to do extra operations 
while accessing the data, which would harm the performance. Inside the function on 
the lines 7–8 we use a new data type,      m128 — 4 single-precision floating-point  values 
stored in one variable.  On the line 8 we use an intrinsic  (see Chapter  2.2.2) for the first 
time, _mm_set_ps — replicate the argument (in the given case it is variable q) 4 times 
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to make a     m128. Next, as we are working on 4 pieces of data simultaneously, the loop 
counter is incremented by 4 instead of 1. Before we perform the triad operation itself, 
we get array elements from the memory on the lines 12–13. The multiplication and the 
addition operations are replaced by their SSE versions — _mm_mul_ps and _mm_add_ps 
correspondingly  (lines 16–17). On the line 20 result is stored back to the array a. 
 
 
1  #define VECTOR_SIZE 4 
2 
3  __declspec(align(16))  float a[SIZE], b[SIZE], c[SIZE]; 
4  float q; 
5 
6  void triad() { 
7  __m128 product , sum , current_c , current_b; 
8  __m128 q_packed = 
9 
_mm_set_ps(q); 
10  for (int i = 0; i < SIZE; i += VECTOR_SIZE) { 
11  // get current elements of arrays b and c 
12  current_b = *((__m128 *) &b[i]); 
13  current_c = *((__m128 *) &c[i]); 
14 
15  // calculate triad operation 
16  product = _mm_mul_ps(current_c , q_packed); 
17  sum = _mm_add_ps(current_b , product); 
18 
19  // store result 
20  *(__m128 *) & a[i] = sum; 
21  } 
22  } 
Listing 2.4: Vectorized loop 
 
In order to better understand the design choices made in this thesis, we will take a 
more detailed look at the internals of the SSE hardware implementation and at the 
available instructions. 
 
2.2.1  Hardware implementation 
 
The x86–64 architecture provides 16 128-bit wide registers that are available for the SSE 
instructions.  Figure 2.2 compares them with normal GPRs. It should be noted however, 
that even though only 16 registers are visible at the assembly level, much more registers 
(e.g. 168 SSE-AVX registers in Intel Haswell) are implemented physically and can be 
used for renaming. Specifically, starting from the Intel NetBurst microarchitecture, SSE 
values are stored in a separate register file that is shared between SSE and floating-point 
operations. 
In the Intel’s implementation, SSE instructions are executed by the Floating Point 
Units (FPU).  In the initial implementations (e.g. in the Intel Pentium III) the instruction 
decoder transformed all 128-bit instructions into pairs of 64-bit microinstructions, which 
were executed in parallel using ILP available in the super-scalar processors.  In the 
modern implementations  (e.g. in the Intel Core 2) SSE has 128-bit dedicated FPUs. In 
addition to that, processors usually have separate modules for the most frequent or the 
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Figure 2.2: GPR and SSE registers compared 
 
 
most costly operations, such as multiplication,  shuffle or memory access. It provides 
a higher level of parallelism and allows to avoid some common bottlenecks.  As one 
example, an execution unit of the Intel Core 2 microarchitecture (presented in 2006) is 
shown in Figure 2.3 with SSE parts highlighted. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Intel Core 2 execution unit 
Here: ALU  — scalar arithmetic logic unit, FMUL/FDIV — SSE floating point 
multiplication and division unit, SSE  MUL — SSE integer multiplication, 
and SSE  ALU  — SSE integer ALU. 
 
 
 
2.2.2  SSE instruction  set  and intrinsics 
 
In general, SSE has two modes of operation — it can operate in parallel on all data 
operands (packed mode) or on the least significant pairs of operands (scalar mode). In 
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other words, in the scalar mode SSE registers operate as normal GPRs. In this thesis, 
we use the packed mode because it allows to operate on two replicas simultaneously. 
SSE also provides two modes of floating point arithmetic — IEEE-compliant, which 
has higher precision and is more portable, and flush-to-zero mode, which has higher 
performance. In our work, we always assume a default IEEE-compliant mode. 
The SSE instruction set can be boiled down to the following instruction types: arith- 
metic, logic and comparisons, data movement and reorganization, type conversion, state 
save and restore, memory streaming and caching, media and other special purpose 
instructions. In this thesis, we use only some instruction  types, which we describe in 
more details in the following. 
Arithmetic and Logic. SSE covers most of the arithmetic operations, except the 
modulo operation. Moreover, multiplication  and addition have horizontal versions, that 
is, they can operate on pairs of numbers inside one register, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
Logical operations are only implemented in bitwise versions. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Horizontal addition 
 
Comparison.  Comparisons act a bit different than their counterparts in the general 
instruction set. In the first place, they do not set flags in the EFLAGS register (used 
to drive control-flow in x86), which makes an implementation of jumps much more 
complicated. The only exception is PTEST, which sets the Z flag in the status register 
by performing an AND between its operands, thus allowing to do jumps using packed 
values directly. The second issue is the return value. Instead of returning a boolean, as 
normal comparisons do, they return either all “1” (if result is “True”) or all “0” (in case 
of “False”). It makes sense in terms of implementation since the comparison is performed 
on multiple pieces of data and a single boolean value won’t be enough to represent a 
result (like in the case when x1 < y1 but x2 > y2). But from the other side, there are no 
control flow instructions that could operate on these sequences of “1” and “0”, which 
leads to extra efforts for extracting data and consequently to lower performance. 
Data movement.  SSE can efficiently access a 128-bit wide data in the memory, but 
the memory address has to be specified using a GPR.  It may lead in some cases to 
additional type conversions and in particular, to an extraction from an XMM register. 
This is an expensive operation, with a latency of 6 cycles in Intel Haswell. 
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Data shuffle. Shuffle is a peculiar SIMD  operation that performs data rearrangement 
inside registers. One example of the shuffle is shown in Figure 2.5. In combination 
with other operations (in particular with horizontal ones), it allows to get much of the 
functionality that is not implemented in hardware. For example, we can get a horizontal 
test for equality using a combination of the shuffle, horizontal subtraction and PTEST 
(see Chapter  4 for more details). 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Shuffle  operation 
 
Type casting and conversion.  There are two ways to change a type of a variable 
in SSE — convert and cast. Convert  allows to change bit representation of a data, e.g. 
from integer “123” to floating point “1.23 × 102”. Cast  does not change the bits in 
data but merely tells a compiler to treat a given value differently. A type conversion 
is implemented in hardware and quite expensive from the performance point of view, 
especially for scalar types. Casts, on the other hand, do not take any time at all, since 
they do not generate any assembly instructions. 
 
Our approach works as a source-to-source compiler and needs an interface to operate 
with assembly instructions. One option is inlined assembly available, for example, in 
GCC as a special asm  keyword. It requires, however, a significant amount of work to 
reimplement all the functionality available at the assembly level in C code.  A much 
better and easier solution is to use SSE  intrinsics, which provide a C-level, macro-like 
interface to abstract the SSE instructions via built-in functions implemented directly 
by the compiler. Such approach allows to get all the power of SSE without a need to 
worry about register allocation or code scheduling because the compiler makes all these 
optimizations by itself. 
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3  Design 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we discussed cheap software-based fault tolerance approaches. 
They provide two advantages: the ability to run on commodity hardware and moderate 
performance overheads.  For example, SWIFT [Rei+05] showed an impressive result 
of only 40% overhead on VLIW architecture.  However, when deployed on a regular 
x86 machine, its overhead is much worse — 120% as reported by ESoftCheck [YGS09]. 
The goal of our thesis is to lower this performance overhead and make a single-treaded 
software-based solution with less than 80% performance overhead on the x86 architecture. 
Our approach is to employ SIMD technology (see Chapter  2.2.2) for executing op- 
erations on duplicated data, instead of having all instructions executed twice. Such 
trade-off is valid while SIMD is not used in most applications, excluding media and 
scientific ones. It also satisfies the availability  requirement since SIMD  can be considered a 
commodity hardware — virtually all modern CPUs have it: PowerPC (IBM) has 
AltiVec, ARM has Neon, and the most common x86 architecture has SSE and AVX. We 
will, however, concentrate on SSE as the most prevalent one. We do not consider AVX 
because it consumes more power (although, it is difficult to find official numbers) while 
not providing any noticeable benefits neither to fault tolerance nor to performance. 
In the following we discuss in more details the assumptions of our design (including 
system and fault models), the overall architecture and its limitations. 
 
 
3.1  Assumptions 
 
We assume a general-purpose microprocessor with support of SSE4.2. This assumption 
holds on all Intel processors starting from Nehalem microarchitecture and AMD starting 
from Barcelona or, put simply, on most commodity processors produced after 2007. We 
also assume no memory or register protection.  Even though ECC protection for memory 
is quite common nowadays, studies show that it does not cover all the faults [SPW09; 
NDO11]. Therefore, our system model makes no assumptions on memory reliability  and 
admits errors in DRAM and CPU caches. 
Our solution requires source code of the program, not an executable binary.  It is 
caused by the fact that it works as a source-to-source compiler (more about it in the 
next section). Moreover, we rely on the correctness of the code itself and do not protect 
from software bugs. 
We use the Single Event Upset (SEU) fault model, which basically means that only 
one bit-flip is expected during the whole execution of a program.  By a bit-flip, we 
mean an unexpected change in the state of a memory cell or a CPU register.  This 
also includes errors in memory bus, registers, functional units, etc. The SEU is not 
permanently damaging the hardware but is transient and lasts only until the next write 
to the cell/register. 
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Even though we assume SEU, our approach can work with more than one bit-flip, 
as long as they do not change both duplicates in the same way.  Indeed, by design 
SIMD-Swift  detects all faults except those that alter both copies of the same data. One 
vivid example of a fault that cannot be detected by our approach (false negative) can be a 
noise with a high energy level that sets all bits of the register to the same value (all 
“1” or all “0”). The other potential source of false negatives could be a common mode 
failure since both duplicates are held in a single register or memory location. Our fault 
model also does not cover control flow errors, except those caused by a fault in control 
flow instruction arguments. For example, in statement if(a), faults will be caught in 
variable a, but not in if itself. 
Our sphere of replication (SoR) covers the CPU and the memory used by the protected 
program and we do not include the operating system, disk and network subsystems in it. 
Our solution considers only fault detection, not fault recovery, although any recovery 
mechanism can be applied upon fault detection.  However, recovery mechanisms are 
usually very costly and are applied only in the infrequent cases of errors, while fault 
detection should be continuous and thus efficient. As such, we adopt a crash-stop model 
when a program is forced to crash upon a detected fault. 
 
 
3.2  System and Fault  Models 
 
As mentioned above, our approach works as a source-to-source compiler, that is, a 
program that takes a source code as an input, makes changes in its structure and returns 
a modified source code. Specifically  in our case, the functionality  is not changed but 
the fault detection capabilities are added to the application — it continuously checks its 
own integrity. 
Another way for implementing our approach could be a compiler extension (such 
as an LLVM pass), which changes code at compile-time. This would give a benefit of 
working with a code that has already been optimized by a compiler and thus, it might 
improve performance of our solution. It, however, would require much more time for 
development and we consider it as our future work. That is why the source-to-source 
compiler approach was chosen for a prove-of-concept implementation. 
Before we dive deeper into the architecture, consider a general structure of a normal 
compiler, shown in Figure 3.1 [Aik14]. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Compiler structure 
 
In the stage of the Lexical Analysis, program source is divided into so-called “tokens” 
(words) of the program. After that, the Parser tries to define a structure of the program 
by grouping together tokens into higher level constructs. The result of the parsing stage 
is the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), which captures the nesting structure of the program, 
but abstracts from the concrete syntax. For example, an expression “5 + (2 + 3)” will be 
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transformed into the AST shown in Figure 3.2. The next stage is the Semantic  Analysis 
in which the compiler tries to make variable bindings and find inconsistencies like type 
mismatches, scope violations, etc. The Optimization step makes a set of changes to the 
program structure in order to make it run faster or use less memory, or even consume less 
power. The Code Generator  translates the resulting AST into a programing language, 
usually into the target machine assembly. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Example of Abstract Syntax Tree 
 
Our source-to-source compiler has a slightly different structure. In the first place, it 
has a weaker semantic analysis and no optimizations, because the C compiler (e.g., GCC) 
will perform these operations on the resulting code anyway. The second major difference 
is a new Transformation stage, which actually applies SIMD-Swift  to the target program. 
Figure  3.3 shows a resulting structure of our framework. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: SIMD-Swift compiler structure 
 
Consider a small example shown in Listing 3.1. 
 
1  // b, c and d are input arguments 
2  a = b + c; 
3  r = d * a; 
4  printf("Result: %d", r); 
Listing 3.1: Original target code 
The transformer makes the following set of changes to the program: 
Variable conversion.  In order to use a hardened code in a non-hardened environment 
we need an entry point.  We use a computation function for this purpose, which duplicates 
input arguments, makes a call to the hardened part of the program using duplicated 
arguments and then extracts the result from the return value. Figure 3.4 shows a 
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process of duplication  and extraction.  Here XMM — SSE registers, GPR — general-purpose 
registers. 
All variables inside of the hardened part of the program are replaced by duplicated 
versions. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Variable conversion 
(a) Extraction, (b) Duplication 
 
After this set of transformations our target code will be changed to Listing 3.2. 
 
1  // b, c and d are input arguments 
2  b_dup = duplicate(b); 
3  c_dup = duplicate(c); 
4  d_dup = duplicate(d); 
5 
6  // computation over hardened variables 
7  a_dup = b_dup + c_dup; 
8  r_dup = d_dup * a_dup; 
9 
10  // get result 
11  r = extract(r_dup); 
12  printf("Result: %d", r); 
Listing 3.2: Target code with variables converted 
 
Checks. Before the program returns the output variables, they need to be checked 
for integrity. It should also be done in all points that may influence the output of the 
program, but we use accumulators there instead (see below). 
In our case, the check is a comparison of two duplicates for equality.  Indeed, such 
comparison definitely detects a fault, since the fault can change the output value in 
only one copy of the result (by assumption in Section 3.1). This can be challenging, 
since we have to compare two parts of the same register and, as we show in Chapter 4, 
modern SIMD implementations do not provide a single dedicated instruction for that. To 
guarantee that all program results were indeed correctly computed, all output variables 
of the program are checked. 
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In our example, a check should be added before the printf statement, which acts as 
an output event (see Listing  3.3, line 11). 
Accumulators. The check operation is usually expensive (see Chapter 4) and would 
harm performance if used everywhere in the program. In order to avoid this, we applied 
checks only to the outputs of the program, and in all points that may influence an output 
(memory access and control flow operations) we used accumulation. Such replacement is 
valid since the accumulator is a variable that is dependent on all critical variables in 
the program, which means that an error in any of these variables will lead to an error 
in the accumulator. Check of the accumulator in the end of the program shows if any 
error appeared during its execution. Any operation that satisfies this requirement can 
be used as an accumulation  — for instance, addition. As an example, if a and b are the 
critical variables, and a fault affected b, than accum = a + b' will be also affected, and 
the check on accum will signal an error. 
Moreover, there is no need to check or accumulate the results of all instructions because 
most of the variables are dependent on each other, that is, an error in one of them will 
propagate to the others. For example, an error on line 2 of Listing 3.1 will lead to a 
wrong result of the multiplication  on line 3 and will propagate further to the printf 
statement. It means that it is enough to accumulate only the resulting value printed on 
line 3. 
Accumulation is required on the following critical operations of the program: 
 
• Memory accesses (loads and stores). If a memory address contains an error, it will 
lead to a load of a wrong value. This category includes pointer dereference, array 
and structure element access. 
 
• Control  flow operations.  An error in variables that are used for branching may 
lead to a change in the control flow direction.  For example, an error in branch 
condition can lead to taking a False branch when it had to be a True branch. It 
includes if and switch statements, and conditions in loops. 
 
Basic and composite operations. By basic operations we understand operations 
that cannot be further subdivided into components. Such operations are replaced by 
ad-hoc wrappers. For example, the addition a = b + c will be replaced by the function 
call a = add_enc(b, c) (see Listing 3.3). Composite operations that consist of basic 
ones are replaced by subsequent calls to wrappers, with casts and conversions added if 
required. For example, d = a + b - c transforms into d = sub(add(a, b), c). 
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1  // b, c and d are input arguments 
2  b_dup = duplicate(b); 
3  c_dup = duplicate(c); 
4  d_dup = duplicate(d); 
5 
6  // basic operations replaced with hardened versions 
7  a_dup = add_enc(b_dup , c_dup); 
8  r_dup = mul_enc(d_dup , a_dup); 
9 
10  // get result 
11  check(r_dup); 
12  r = extract(r_dup); 
13  printf("Result: %d", r); 
Listing 3.3: Target code with basic operations replaced by wrappers 
 
Comparisons. Comparisons in SSE implement a different interface than normal ones. 
Usually, comparisons toggle the status register (EFLAGS in x86) to affect the control 
flow of a program. In SSE, however, all comparisons return an integer value with either 
all “1” in case of True, or all “0” in case of False. Any other value will indicate an error, 
because it is impossible (in error-free case) that two copies of the same data produce 
different comparison results. For example, if we have duplicated  variables a and b, it is 
impossible for one copy of a to be greater than b and another — to be smaller. If it is 
actually the case, this indicates a fault. 
To actually influence the control flow of the program, the resulting value is converted 
into a boolean just before usage in control flow statement. For example, a simple branch 
in Listing 3.4 will be transformed into Listing 3.5. 
 
1 
2 
3     if (a < b) { 
4  // do something 
5     } 
Listing 3.4: Original branch 
1     int128 c = less_than(a, b); 
2     int c_bool = to_boolean(c); 
3     if (c_bool) 
4  // do something 
5     } 
Listing 3.5: Hardened branch 
 
Library calls. Function calls to external libraries cannot be hardened since we do 
not have access to their source code. That is why we accumulate the arguments of the 
call to ensure correct input, execute the non-protected call and then duplicate the result. 
 
Consider a small example of the source code transformation performed by the SIMD- 
Swift source-to-source compiler.  Listings  3.6 and 3.7 show the comparison of the original 
code with its hardened version. The code is the simple function that calculates a given 
element of the Fibonacci  sequence. 
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1 
2 
3     int computation(int n) { 
4  int i, next; 
5  int first , second; 
6  first = 0; 
7  second = 1; 
8  i = 2; 
9  for(; i < n; i++) { 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17  next = first + second; 
18  first = second; 
19  second = next; 
20 
21  } 
22 
23  return next; 
24     } 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41     int main() { 
42  int n = 20; 
43  int next = computation(n); 
44  printf("Result: %d", next); 
45  return 0; 
46     } 
Listing 3.6: Original code 
1     int128 accum = 0; 
2 
3     int128 computation_enc(int128  n) { 
4  int128 i, next; 
5  int128 first , second; 
6  first = to_int128(0); 
7  second = to_int128(1); 
8  i = to_int128(2); 
9  for(;;) { 
10  accum += i; 
11  accum += n; 
12  // note inverse condition 
13  if(extract(geq(i,  n))) { 
14  break; 
15  } 
16 
17  next = add_enc(first , second); 
18  first = second; 
19  second = next; 
20  i = add_enc(i, to_int128(1)); 
21  } 
22 
23  return next; 
24     } 
25 
26     // wrapper for old computation 
27     int computation(int n) { 
28  int result; 
29  int128 n_dup , result_dup; 
30 
31  n_dup = to_int128(n); 
32  result_dup = computation_enc(n_dup); 
33  if !check(result_dup)  || !check(accum) 
34  crash(); 
35  result = extract(result_dup); 
36 
37  return result; 
38     } 
39 
40     // left as-is 
41     int main() { 
42  int n = 20; 
43  int next = computation(n); 
44  printf("Result: %d\n", next); 
45  return 0; 
46     } 
Listing 3.7: Hardened code 
 
The main function represents an entry point to the hardened part of the program — 
computation function, which is transformed using SIMD-Swift. 
After the transformation, the computation function does not perform its main func- 
tionality  anymore and becomes a point of data conversion. On lines 28–29, we initialize 
variables and on line 29 we use a pseudo-type int128 which represents a duplicated 
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integer. On line 31 we convert an input argument to this type and pass it to the hardened 
computation_enc function on line 32. After that, the result and the accumulator are 
checked for errors on line 33 and decoded back to integer on line 35. 
All the original functionality is moved to the computation_enc function on lines 3–24. 
The main change here is the loop (see Listings  3.8 and 3.9). It is broken into three pieces: 
the loop itself is replaced by generic infinite for on line 1, the loop invariant is pulled 
out into the separate if statement on lines 3–4 and the loop counter incrementation is 
also pulled in the separate operation in the end of the loop, line 5. This reformatting 
does not affect the semantics of the loop, but simplifies the analysis and transformation 
of source code. 
 
1     for(; i < n; i++) { 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6     } 
Listing 3.8: Original loop 
1     for(;;) { 
2  // note inverse condition 
3  if (i >= n) 
4  break; 
5  i++; 
6     } 
Listing 3.9: Refactored loop 
 
Going back to our example in Listing 3.7, a check on loop invariant is replaced by 
the wrapper function geq on line 13, result of which is immediately decoded to boolean 
using extract.  Before that, variables i and n are accumulated,  because an error in 
each of them may influence control flow of the program. Counter incrementation is also 
replaced by a wrapper function call and put on line 20. The variables’ initialization  in 
the hardened version is done using duplicated  constants on lines 6–8. 
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4  Implementation 
 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed a general architecture of SIMD-Swift.  Now let us 
consider its implementation details. We will start with technologies used in each step of 
the source-to-source compilation  and then will go into more details of the transformation 
stage. We will also examine the drawbacks of our implementation. 
 
 
4.1  Used  technologies 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, our implementation includes five steps: Lexical Analysis, 
Parsing, Semantic Analysis, Transformation and Code Generation. 
The first step of Lexical  Analysis  uses Python  Lex-Yacc  (PLY) library  [Bea01], which 
provides an extensible Python implementation of common tools lex and yacc, and 
allows to build lexers and parsers upon it. Even though it is quite slow due to its Python 
implementation, it can be used for languages with complex grammar rules and allows 
fast and clear prototyping. 
Parsing and Code Generation are implemented using PyCParser  [Ben10]. PyCParser 
is a C language parser, written in pure Python and based upon PLY. 
Semantic analysis and Transformation stages are based on our inhouse encoding 
framework that provides a generic implementation of a source-to-source compiler with 
extensible hooks for writing concrete encoders. In this thesis we have developed such an 
extension for SIMD-Swift  and in the following, we will consider its essential elements. 
 
 
4.2  Transformations 
 
The Transformation stage performs three fundamental changes to the program: it changes 
data types, replaces operations and adds checks and accumulations. 
 
4.2.1  Data  types  replacement 
On the intrinsics  level (see Chapter  2.2.2), SSE has only three data types available: 
•    m128 — 4 packed single-precision floating-point  variables; 
•    m128d — 2 packed double-precision floating-point  variables; 
•    m128i — packed integer variables (e.g. 2 64-bit integers); 
 
All basic types are replaced as shown in Table 4.1. We use only two types      m128d 
and     m128i containing 2 64-bit integers, since we do not need more than two copies 
for fault detection (under the assumptions discussed in Chapter 3.1) and it simplifies 
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the implementation. This may lead, however, to changes in a program behavior if, for 
instance, it relies on 32-bit integer overflow. But we do not address the issue and leave 
it for future work, assuming that our current benchmarks do not have this behavior. 
 
Original type Replacement type 
Integer types (including  int8, uint8, int16, etc.) 
Pointer types (including arrays and structures) 
float, double 
_Bool 
    m128i 
    m128i 
    m128d 
    m128i 
 
Table 4.1: Type mapping. 
 
User-defined types and structures are tracked down to basic ones and replaced accord- 
ingly. For example, a structure {int x, int y} is replaced by its duplicated version 
{     m128i x,       m128i y}. Enumerations are considered a special case and are 
treated as integer constants. 
By replacing the data types, we ensure that the original code is hardened, i.e., all 
variables become duplicated and all operations are performed on two copies. 
 
4.2.2  Basic  operations 
 
By basic operations, we understand operations that cannot be further divided into 
sub-operations and, in most cases, have a one-to-one mapping to assembly instructions 
(e.g. add, mul, xor, etc). Since we use two data types —     m128i and     m128d, all such 
operations must have two corresponding implementations, one for 64-bit integers and 
one for double-precision floating-points (doubles). 
Arithmetic operations. 
Most arithmetic  operations have an implementation in SSE for both integer and 
floating-point types, since SSE was initially targeted for data processing. Issues appear 
only with integer division and modulo operations which are used quite rarely and hence 
have no SSE equivalents. Since they cannot be replaced with any other operations (at 
least not in a general case), we had to use an EDDI-like approach [OSM02] and execute 
them twice. Table 4.2 shows instructions  used for arithmetic operations. 
 
Operation Assembly 
(int) 
Assembly 
(float) 
Intrinsic (int) Intrinsic (float) 
Addition 
Subtraction 
Multiplication 
Division 
Modulo 
PADDQ 
PSUBQ 
PMULQ 
IDIV x2 
IDIV x2 
ADDPD 
SUBPD 
MULPD 
DIVPD 
- 
_mm_add_epi64 
_mm_sub_epi64 
_mm_mul_epi64 
Duplicated 
Duplicated 
_mm_add_pd 
_mm_sub_pd 
_mm_mul_pd 
_mm_div_pd 
- 
 
Table 4.2: Arithmetic operations. 
 
Division and modulo could also be implemented in the following way: we could convert 
integer values to floating-point, perform floating-point division/modulo  and then convert 
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back. It would have, however, even higher overhead since SSE conversions are expensive 
(e.g., conversion from     m128i to     m128d takes 4 cycles on Intel Haswell) and cannot 
be executed in parallel due to data dependency. 
Operations with pointers. 
Pointers duplicated in     m128i cannot be used directly  because modern processors 
require a memory address operand to be a 64-bit integer. That means before each 
memory access, we need to extract a pointer and accumulate its duplicated value, since 
we use only one copy and an error in this copy may silently lead to a load of a wrong 
value or a store to a wrong address (see Figure  4.1). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Memory  access. 
 
Pointer arithmetic (i.e., adding an integer to a pointer or subtraction of two pointers), 
however, may be performed without these additional  operations. We can execute all 
operations directly on duplicated values and extract lazily — right before the memory 
access. 
Boolean logical operations. 
Boolean logic has no implementation in SSE, but it can easily be replaced by other 
operations.  Boolean AND (&& in C) can be replaced by integer multiplication  since 
they have the equivalent behavior with boolean numbers (False — zero value, True — 
non-zero). Table 4.3 shows the truth table of both multiplication and logical AND. 
Logical OR (|| in C) can be replaced by a bitwise version. In bitwise OR, if at least one 
of two variables is not equal to zero (contains bits with value “1”), then result will also 
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Operation Resulting value 
True && True 
True && False 
False && False 
!= 0 
0 
0 
 
Table 4.3: Truth table for logical AND. 
 
be non-zero — which is a behavior of logical OR. Table 4.4 illustrates this on two cases: 
both variables are zero (False) and at least one variable is non-zero (True). 
 
True OR True False OR False 
0100 
0010 
0000 
0000 
0110 0000 
 
Table 4.4: Logical OR replaced by bitwise OR. 
 
Bitwise logical operations and shifts. 
Most of the bitwise logical operations are available for 128-bit variables in SSE as 
shown in Table 4.5.  The only exception is NOT (logical complement), but it can be 
replaced with XOR with a register containing all bits set to “1”. 
 
Operation Intrinsic Assembly 
AND 
OR 
XOR 
Left shift 
Right shift 
_mm_and_si128 
_mm_or_si128 
_mm_xor_si128 
_mm_sll_epi64 
_mm_srl_epi64 
PAND 
POR 
PXOR 
PSLLQ 
PSRLQ 
 
Table 4.5: Bitwise operations. 
 
Comparisons. 
SSE includes all floating point comparisons, but only Equal (PCMPEQQ) and Greater 
Than (PCMPGTQ) are implemented for integers. All other operations, however, can be 
replaced with those two as presented in Table 4.6. 
 
4.2.3  Composite  operations 
 
A general approach to encoding any composite node in Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) 
is to encode the node name (in order to avoid conflicts with non-hardened variables), 
replace types and recursively encode child nodes until we reach basic operations. This 
way there is no need in implementing composite operations since we already have a way 
to encode basic ones and all their combinations. 
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Operation Replacement 
a != b 
a < b 
a <= b 
a >= b 
(double) a != (double) b 
b > a 
!(a > b) 
!(b > a) 
 
Table 4.6: Implementation of comparisons. 
 
 
4.2.4  Integrity checks 
 
In the critical points of execution duplicated variables have to be compared for equality 
in order to avoid error propagation (see Chapter  3.2). Such operation is not available in 
SSE, but it can be replaced with horizontal subtraction, that is, a subtraction of scalar 
variables inside of a packed variable. If two duplicates are equal, the result will be zero. 
If there was an error and the duplicates are different, the result of their subtraction will 
be non-zero. Afterwards,  we can check this result with PTEST that performs a test for 
all zeros and returns a boolean value. This value, in turn, can be used for branching and 
executing a recovery mechanism in case of error. Since we operate on 64-bit integers and 
horizontal subtraction is available only for 32-bit integer and smaller, a shuffle has to be 
performed before subtraction to reorder 32-bit parts of a register. Figure 4.2 illustrates 
this idea. Unfortunately,  this sequence of instructions  has a total latency of 6 cycles (on 
Intel Haswell) and therefore is quite expensive. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Implementation of checks. 
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Accumulations. 
Accumulation is much simpler and thus faster. It is implemented with the addition 
(PADD) of a variable-to-check to an accumulator. In order to avoid redundant interactions 
with main memory, one of the XMM registers is dedicated to accumulation (e.g., by using 
register keyword in gcc), which leads to a latency of only 1 cycle (on Intel Haswell). 
 
 
4.3  Performance bottlenecks 
 
Our approach has two major performance bottlenecks: comparisons and memory accesses. 
Both of them are caused by the non-availability  of corresponding SSE instructions and 
thus, an increased number of instructions is required to perform the operation. 
 
4.3.1  Comparisons 
 
The main issue of comparisons in SSE is that they do not set the EFLAGS register and 
therefore, cannot be used for control flow operations (branching) directly. In order to 
use them, we need an additional instruction that converts the resulting    m128i value 
to a boolean and sets the corresponding flags. Moreover, we require accumulation before 
jumps since their arguments influence a control flow of a program. Listing  4.2 shows an 
example of additional instructions that appear after hardening. 
 
1 
2     ; implicitly set flags in EFLAGS 
3     CMP %eax , %ebx 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11     ; take a branch based on set flags 
12     JGT .L0 
Listing 4.1: Original comparison 
(2 instructions — 2 cycles) 
1     ; put 0's or 1's in XMM1 
2     ; for later check 
3     PCMPGTQ %xmm0 , %xmm1 
4 
5     ; accumulate in register xmm15 
6     PADDQ %xmm1 , %xmm15 
7 
8     ; AND with all 1's register xmm14 
9     ; and set ZF flag if result 
10     ; is zero 
11     PTEST %xmm14 , %xmm1 
12     JE .L0 
Listing 4.2: Hardened comparison 
(4 instructions — 6 cycles) 
 
 
4.3.2  Memory accesses 
 
This bottleneck is similar to comparisons. A memory access requires an address operand 
to be a 64-bit integer, but pointers in a hardened program have type      m128i.  That 
means we need an additional extraction, and also accumulation since an error in the 
address will either lead to a load of wrong value or a store to the wrong address (lost 
update). Listing  4.4 shows such transformation. 
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1     ; load from address 
2     ; specified in %rax 
3     ; a value into %ebx 
4     MOV (%rax), %ebx 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Listing 4.3: Original memory access 
(1 instruction — 1 cycle) 
1     ; xmm0 contains address operand. 
2     ; Accumulate it in register xmm15 
3     ; for later check 
4     PADDQ %xmm0 , %xmm15 
5 
6     ; extract address 
7     MOVQ %xmm0 , %rax 
8 
9     ; use address to load value 
10     MOVAPS (%rax), %xmm1 
Listing 4.4: Hardened  memory  access 
(3 instructions — 6 cycles) 
 
Situation is even sadder than with comparisons, since SSE moves often have a high 
latency  (e.g., AMD Piledriver requires 5 cycles for each movement between XMM 
registers). It gets even worse when we access an array element, because we also need to 
extract and accumulate the element’s index. 
 
 
4.4  Alternative  implementation 
 
We can avoid the memory access bottleneck by not duplicating  pointers at all. This way 
we trade fault tolerance for performance by having less computational  overhead but at 
the same time making our approach vulnerable to errors in pointers. Let us consider 
consequences of applying  such a trade-off. 
An error in pointer that is used for loading may lead to the following consequences: 
 
1. The address becomes unreachable.  In this case, a segmentation fault will be thrown 
and the program will crash (benign failure). 
 
2. The address points to allocated but unused memory. The error will lead to Silent 
Data Corruption (SDC) because allocated memory is initialized with zeros and 
two equal zero-filled duplicates will be loaded. 
 
3. The address points to unallocated or to allocated and used memory. The error 
will be detected if a first loaded duplicate is not equal to the second one. This 
situation is most probable since this memory address will contain random values 
and two subsequent 64-bit chunks of memory are likely to be different. 
 
If a pointer is used for storing, it will lead to a benign crash in case (1) and to a lost 
update in all the other cases. 
Our hypothesis is that most errors in pointers will lead to a segmentation fault and 
those that will not, will be caught with high probability by SIMD-Swift  as shown in case 
(3). In order to verify it we designed two tests. 
In the first test, we load a known integer value from memory and then check if it is 
correct (original version). In the second test, we do the same, but the value is duplicated 
and the duplicates are checked for equality after the load (hardened version). The original 
version can catch errors of case (1), while the hardened version also catches errors of 
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case (3). In both tests our goal is to define what is a probability of SDC. In order to do 
this, we inject a single-bit flip fault in the load address and check the resulting value. In 
the beginning of each test we allocate a chunk of memory, which allows us to see the 
impact of allocated-memory size on the SDC rate. Figure 4.3 shows the results of these 
tests. Here, “hardened” means a version where pointer is not duplicated but memory 
value is. We increase the size of allocated memory only up to 800 MiB because it is the 
highest size we could allocate on a Linux machine with 2GB of RAM. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Results of pointer fault injection. 
 
As we can see, only in 35–39% of cases an error in a pointer will lead to SDC even 
for non-hardened program, and it gets lower with SIMD-Swift  because some errors are 
caught as in case 3. These results give us hope that such an alternative implementation 
may not cause a significant decrease in fault detection capabilities while giving us an 
improvement in performance. 
Also, we can notice a slight correlation between the SCD rate and the size of allocated 
memory, but it is insignificant. 
 
An evaluation of performance overhead and fault tolerance for both full and alternative 
implementations will be presented in Chapter 5. 
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5  Evaluation 
 
 
In this chapter, we will consider fault detection capabilities and performance overhead 
of SIMD-Swift for both the full implementation (referred to as “full”) and the imple- 
mentation without pointer duplication (referred to as “pointerless”).  The set of tested 
benchmarks consists of: 
 
• basic integer algorithms: Bubble sort, Fibonacci sequence and Sieve of Eratosthenes 
(SoE); 
• floating-point  algorithms:  numerical implementation of sine and Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT); 
• benchmarks from MiBench [Gut+01]: Dijkstra’s algorithm and Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC); 
 
Bubblesort  and Dijkstra  represent memory-access-dominated algorithms.  FFT and 
Sine consist primarily of arithmetic instructions. SoE, CRC and Fibbonacci contain a 
significant amount of control-flow operations. 
We will start with the performance testing, continue with the fault injection and then 
discuss the results. 
 
 
5.1  Performance testing 
 
For the performance overhead evaluation we used a computer with the following charac- 
teristics: 
 
• RAM: 8GB 
• CPU: Intel Core i5-5200U (Broadwell microarchitecture) 
• Caches: 
– L1: 128 KB 
– L2: 512 KB 
– L3: 3072 KB 
The benchmarks were compiled using the GCC version  5.1.1 with SSE4.2 enabled 
(-msse4.2), AVX disabled (-mno-avx), x86-64 instruction  set (-m64) and all optimiza- 
tions (-O3). For the performance testing we used PyCPerf tool [Ole15] which uses the 
Time Stamp Counter and RDTSC instruction for measuring how many CPU cycles it 
takes to execute a given region of code. All benchmarks were running for at least one 
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second with the fixed input. Each benchmark was tested in two variants: “full” — all 
variables are duplicated, and “pointerless” — pointers are not protected by duplication. 
Figure 5.1 shows the performance overheads of all benchmarks compared to the native 
execution. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Performance testing results. 
 
As we can see, the results are varying for different types of benchmarks.  The bench- 
marks are grouped by performance results: for FFT, CRC, Sine and Bubblesort (point- 
erless implementation)  we managed to get less than 80% overhead, and others perform 
worse than SWIFT (more than 100% overhead).  It is caused by the fact that some 
benchmarks are influenced by the bottlenecks (see Chapter  4.3), and some are not. We 
discuss this variance in detail in Section 5.3. 
It should be noted that the results may be different not only for other processor 
manufacturers  and models (e.g., AMD) but even for other generations of Intel processors, 
since every next generation makes a bit different performance trade-offs than the previous 
one. For example, PMULUDQ (multiply  the low unsigned 32-bit integers from each packed 
64-bit element in two      m128i variables) has a latency of 3 cycles in Ivy Bridge, whereas 
the same instruction’s latency in Haswell is 5 cycles. But the general tendency will stay 
the same. 
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5.2  Fault  injection 
For the fault injection campaign, we used Intel Pin [Int04] and BFI [Beh15] tools. 
Pin is a binary instrumentation tool, that is, the tool that enables the runtime 
instrumentation on the compiled binary files. BFI uses this functionality to perform 
the runtime fault injection. In our case, BFI injects single-bit faults in CPU registers, 
memory cells and the address bus, once per run (see also our fault model in Section 3.1). 
The faults are random and uniformly distributed in a region of code under consideration. 
A fault may result in one of the five broad types of consequences: 
 
• Silent Data Corruption (SDC) — the fault changed the result, but stayed unde- 
tected. 
 
• Crash — the fault led to an externally-visible program crash. In most cases, it is a 
segmentation fault. 
• Masked — the fault did not affect the result. 
• Detected — SIMD-Swift  detected an error. 
• Hanged — the fault caused a hang of the program. 
 
The main goal of SIMD-Swift is to reduce the number of SDC, but if the rate of 
crashes is increased by our solution, we also consider it as an acceptable result, since they 
are externally-visible.  Many injected faults do not lead to changes in outputs (masked) 
because they affect unused registers and thus do not propagate further. Hangs can 
happen due to a fault changing a loop variable and usually are infrequent. 
We used three representative benchmarks for testing: FFT is dominated by arithmetic 
floating-point instructions, Bubblesort is pointer-dominated (memory-heavy) and SoE 
consists in a large part of control-flow operations (branching).  Each benchmark was 
tested in the original version, with full duplication and without pointer duplication. The 
fault injection results are shown on Figure 5.2. 
 
 
5.3  Discussion 
 
The performance testing results clearly show us the influence of the two main bottlenecks, 
discussed in Chapter 4.3. 
We achieved the lowest overhead with the FFT benchmark, which consists primarily 
of arithmetic floating point operations and a small amount of memory accesses, used 
for reading input and storing results. Such structure caused only 15% overhead  in 
the full version and almost no overhead when we disabled pointer duplication.  The 
similar situation is with the Sine benchmark, but it contains fewer pointer operations — 
which explains the small difference between the full and pointerless versions, and more 
control-flow operations, leading to higher overhead in general. 
Bublesort  and Dijkstra  benchmarks represent memory-access-dominated applications. 
Bubblesort has all array references substituted by direct pointer dereferencing, while 
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Figure 5.2: Fault injection results. 
 
 
Dijkstra is written with array references only. As we can see from results, it caused a 
significant performance improvement for Bubblesort because it extracts address only 
from the pointer itself, while Dijkstra has to extract both array address and index. Also, 
we can see that this type of application  benefits most from pointerless version, since a 
significant part of the code becomes non-duplicated. 
Fibonacci and SoE, on the other hand, had almost no benefit from the pointerless 
version, since they are dominated by control-flow instructions and memory accesses 
constitute only a small portion of their overhead. 
CRC stays a bit aside from other benchmarks because its low overhead is caused 
by numerous calls to the standard library, which are not hardened and thus do not 
experience any overhead. This highlights an interesting property of SIMD-Swift that it 
can be applied to only parts of code (for example, some logging and statistics can be left 
unhardened). 
The fault injection campaign shows that a substantial part of faults stays undetected. 
We examined the sources of SDCs and defined that the vast majority of them are faults in 
either read or write address. It indicates the main window of vulnerability for SIMD-Swift 
— a load and store from the memory. Consider a case of reading from the memory 
(Figure 5.3). In the full version, addresses are kept duplicated  all the time, except just 
before the usage. If a fault occurs in the extracted address, it will be used to load a 
value from the wrong address, and if the low 64 bits of this value are equal to the high 
64 bits, the error will stay undetected and may lead to SDC (see the detailed discussion 
in Chapter 4.4). The fault injections in SoE benchmark prove this observation, since it 
contains only a small amount of memory interactions and hence, is less exposed to this 
window of vulnerability (the SDC rate is roughly 2%). 
This vulnerability  can be removed by executing all load and store operations twice, 
that is, by separately working with the first and second duplicates of the pointer. We 
manually refactored Bubblesort benchmark to use such redundant memory interactions 
and received only 1.4% SDC rate, which is a significant improvement in comparison to 
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Figure 5.3: Window of vulnerability. 
 
 
our previous result — 15.3%. But at the same time performance overhead has grown 
from 108% to 175% and since other benchmarks are expected to have the similar increase, 
we decided not to implement this version as an unpromising one. 
 
 
37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6  Conclusion  And Future Work 
 
 
Modern hardware  shows a trend to an increase in fault rates caused by shrinking 
feature sizes and decreasing voltages. The cheapest way to deal with this issue is to use 
software-level redundancy, that is, to duplicate some part of a code or some variables. 
Nowadays, a wide range of such solutions exists, but most of them are lacking one core 
quality — performance. Therefore, our thesis was targeted to develop a software-based 
fault tolerance approach which could improve performance results of the current solutions. 
In order to do that, we used the Single Instruction Multiple  Data (SIMD) technology to 
duplicate all program’s variables. Such duplication allows to detect faults by a simple 
comparison of two copies under the assumption that only one copy is affected by a fault. 
This idea is based on the observation that SIMD is usually underutilized in modern 
CPUs. We implemented it as a source-to-source compiler which performs hardening of a 
program on the source code level. 
As we have seen in Chapter  5, we did not achieve a desired result for all benchmarks 
due to two inherent bottlenecks — memory accesses and comparisons.  Although  it is 
still reasonable to use SIMD-Swift for the applications that are dominated by arithmetic 
or logic operations (e.g., FFT and Sine benchmarks), such applications  are not very 
common. We believe our approach is most well-suited for those floating-point benchmarks 
that do not benefit from SIMD vectorization. Therefore, in many cases the performance 
overhead is expected to be higher than with alternative hardening approaches, such as 
SWIFT. 
This effect is slightly reduced in the implementation without pointer duplication. 
As we can see from  the results of the fault injection, it only slightly decreases the 
fault detection capabilities of the approach, which is caused by the memory address 
vulnerability  discussed above. At the same time, it significantly improves performance 
of memory-access-dominated applications  by removing one of the main bottlenecks. 
All our implementations perform only fault detection, not fault recovery. That means 
recovery mechanisms have to be applied upon fault detection.  The implementation 
without pointer duplication,  however, relies on the assumption that crashes (especially, 
segmentation faults) can be tolerated and used for detection and this, in turn, decreases 
the range of fault recovery mechanisms which can be used with it. For example, if we use 
the Triple Modular Redundancy approach for recovery by having three copies instead of 
two, we will be able to recover only from detected faults and a crash will just stop the 
execution. 
Our main bottlenecks are caused by the fact that memory and control flow operations 
do not have direct SSE implementation in hardware  (see Section  4.3).  For current 
processors this issue is unsolvable, but the next generation of the Intel Xeon processors 
(Intel Xeon E5-26xx) is expected to have a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) 
[SPW09], which can be used for implementing such functionality.  When the new Xeon 
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processors will go to the market, we may get a significant improvement in performance 
for the SIMD-Swift  approach by adding our own, SIMD-Swift-based instructions. 
Another issue discovered by the fault injection tests is the window of vulnerability 
during a memory access, caused by a usage of non-duplicated  addresses.  It could 
potentially  be resolved by having duplicated load and store operations, but in current 
hardware it worsens performance even further.  We tried this approach on the Bubblesort 
benchmark and got an increase in overhead from 108% to 170%, which is much higher 
even than SWIFT. Having FPGA, however, may help in this case too, since it would allow 
us to implement the duplicated memory access in the hardware. As such, FPGA-assisted 
approach is a promising avenue for future work. 
Our implementation is also lacking a full data type support. In the current version, 
we cast all data types to two basic ones — packed integer (    m128i) and packed 
double (    m128d). In most cases it does not cause any problems, but it may change a 
program’s behavior if it relies on integer overflows. We have made such decision to get a 
proof-of-concept implementation and evaluate the approach in general. We consider full 
data type support as our future work. 
The source-to-source compiler implementation  significantly  restricts the complexity 
of used benchmarks since full support of C requires immense development efforts. That 
is why we evaluated the approach on this restricted implementation, and in future we 
are going to reproduce it as an LLVM pass. That will allow us to test SIMD-Swift on 
real-life applications. 
In the end, SIMD-Swift  proves its potential for some specific types of applications, 
achieving as low as 15% overhead while still providing high level of fault coverage. We 
believe that FPGA-assisted implementation or a smart mix with regular duplicated 
instructions can provide significant benefits in terms of performance and reliability. 
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